STRATEGIC INSIDER TRADING AROUND ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS by XU WEIBIAO
STRATEGIC INSIDER TRADING AROUND 
ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS 
WEIBIAO XU 
(B.S. (Hons.), Sun Yat-Sen University) 
(M.S., National University of Singapore) 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 









I hereby declare that the thesis is my original work and it has been written 
by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information 
which have been used in the thesis. 
 




     
Weibiao Xu 














I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor Professor 
David Mitchell Reeb. This thesis is definitely impossible without his great 
guidance and support. I benefit and learn from him far beyond this thesis.  
I am grateful to my thesis committee members Professor Craig O. Brown, 
Professor Luis Filipe Goncalves-Pinto, Professor Srinivasan 
Sankaraguruswamy, and Professor Wenlan Qian. The constructive 
comments and insightful feedback from them greatly improved this thesis. 
I sincerely thank my Ph.D. coordinator Professor Robert L. Kimmel for his 
kind help and support on my study. 
I am indebted to many of my friends and colleagues from National 
University of Singapore. We had both insightful discussions in school and 
joyful moments outside of school. The companionships supported me 
throughout the time in research. 
I also want to thank the finance department office, Ph.D. program office 
and the IT support unit in NUS Business School for their generous help.  
I would like to acknowledge the Ministry of Education of Singapore to 
provide the research scholarship. 
Last but not least, I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents and my wife 










Table of Contents 
Declaration ..................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... ii 
Summary ...................................................................................................................... iv 
Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2. Literature Review ...................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 3. Data ........................................................................................................... 14 
3.1 Data Source and Sample ................................................................................... 14 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 4. Main Results .............................................................................................. 18 
4.1 Trading Patterns around Analyst Recommendation ......................................... 18 
4.2 Trading Patterns and Liquidity Concerns ......................................................... 21 
4.3 Correlation between Trading Patterns and Firm Litigation Risk ...................... 22 
4.4 Trading Patterns and Changes of Insider Trading Regulations ........................ 24 
4.5 Market Reactions of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation ........... 27 
4.6 Abnormal Profits of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation ............ 29 
4.7 Trading Strategies and CEO Characteristics ..................................................... 30 
Chapter 5. Robustness Checks and Other Tests .......................................................... 33 
5.1 Robustness Checks ............................................................................................ 33 
5.2 Trading Patterns and High versus Low Litigation Risk Industries ................... 34 
5.3 Trading Patterns and High versus Low Scrutiny Firms .................................... 35 
5.4 Trading Patterns and Information Asymmetry between Insiders and Analysts 37 
5.5 Trading Patterns and Accuracy of Analysts ...................................................... 38 
5.6 Trading Patterns and Return Predictability ....................................................... 39 
5.7 Correlation between Trading Patterns and Insiders Compensation .................. 40 
Chapter 6. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 42 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 45 






This paper examines insiders’ trading behavior during the period immediately 
surrounding the release of analyst recommendations. It is shown that insiders 
are more likely to trade after the release of analyst recommendations than 
beforehand. In fact, insiders place 26.8% more trades after, rather than before, 
the publication of these documents. It is also shown that this trading pattern is 
inconsistent with liquidity concern. Instead, the evidence suggests the need for 
political cover and a desire to take advantage of market timing explain insiders’ 
trading behavior around analyst recommendations. Overconfident and 
experienced CEOs are particularly likely to use a market timing strategy after 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
The information advantage gained by those involved in what is known as 
insider trading could possibly have a serious effect on the fairness of the 
securities market. For this reason, regulators have imposed punishments on 
wrongdoing in this area. For example, the Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) was enacted in the United States in 1988 to 
control insider trading and has been the cornerstone of US government 
intervention in this area since. Personal liability for insider traders themselves, 
who misuse non-public information in violation of the Act, is capped at the 
greater of 1 million dollars, or 3 times the profits made or losses avoided. In 
addition, employers who fail to prevent such improper activity by staff 
members, can also be penalized with significant fines. US regulations require 
firms to maintain a supervisory role to prevent insider trading.  
Evidence from existing research indicates that insiders are restricted in their 
ability to trade, at least in the immediate period around key disclosure events, 
by company policies in this area (Lustgarten and Mande (1995), Bettis et al. 
(2000), Huaddart et al. (2007), Jagolinzer and Roulstone (2009) etc.). It has 
been shown, for example, that 80% of firms, in the period since 1990, now 
utilize what is known as a blackout period, in which employees are forbidden 
to place trades, before earnings announcements are made (Bettis et al. 2000).  
However, there is no existing literature that shows or implies any restriction 
on insider activities in the period following analyst recommendations in 
particular. Unlike some corporate events (e.g. earnings announcements), the 
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publication date of recommendations varies considerably between different 
analysts and, importantly, is neither periodic nor predictable. Moreover, 
analysts are external to the companies being assessed and their assessment 
arguably relies on processing external information. For this reason, firms do 
not place restrictions on insider trading around analyst recommendations, 
since their release is not under company control.  
An interesting question is therefore raised: do insiders trade around analyst 
recommendations?  Conceptually, insiders could trade prior to or after analyst 
recommendations. Practically the period after an analyst recommendation 
provides an interesting environment.  
My analysis relies on a combined sample of equity trades, made by company 
insiders, and data on analyst recommendations, for around 5910 US firms (the 
number varies slightly each year), in the period between 1993 through 2012. 
On average, within this combined sample, for each company there were 3.4 
analyst reports each year, with 4.7 analyst recommendations made.  On 
average, for each company, there were 3.78 insiders surveyed, who made an 
annual average figure of 10.9 recorded trades. The number of insider trades 
made in the period immediately around analyst recommendations was 
significantly higher (around 50%) than that for a normal period when there 
was no analyst recommendation.  
I have identified a potentially significant trading pattern that suggests a link 
between insider trades and analyst recommendations. Looking at the time 
period immediately surrounding the release of analyst recommendations, 
insiders place 26.8% more trades in the 7-day period after release, compared 
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to the 7-day period before the release of these recommendations. Moreover, 
insiders place 40% more shares (by volume) in the period after rather than 
before the release of analyst recommendations.  
This thesis sets out to understand and investigate insiders’ decisions to trade 
after analyst recommendations.  I focus on three possible explanations: 
First, it is possible that insiders may have liquidity concerns. For example, in 
order to increase liquidity, insiders could manipulate news events before their 
option vesting period to facilitate their trades (Edmans et al. 2014). As a 
disclosure event, the trading volume around analyst recommendation is high 
so that it is easier for insiders to place trades.  
Second, insiders could use analyst recommendations as political cover to 
avoid litigation risk resulting from the use of other significant inside 
information. Analyst recommendations and reports are public information. 
When they are released, insiders are given a ready rationale to trade in the 
same way as the analysts suggest. In the event, therefore, that insider trading is 
later suspected, the analyst recommendation and report could be provided as 
affirmative evidence to show that insiders are not trading on the basis of non-
public information. This happened in 2009, for example, when attorneys for 
Galleon Group founder Raj Rajaratnam denied a U.S. regulator’s claim that he 
engaged in insider trading, saying he based investments on analyst research 
and media reports.
1
   
Third, the trading could be motivated simply by market timing. Market timing 
is a strategy that insiders employ to try to profit from short-term market heat-
                                                     
1 Source is from http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/15913.htm 
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up or cool-off. In other words, insiders might be using a contrarian strategy, 
against analyst recommendations. As a major disclosure event, the analyst 
recommendation would stimulate the market and drive changes in the stock 
price. Then insiders can capture the opportunity to place opposite trades if the 
market is overheated.  
I test for liquidity concerns by using the abnormal trading volume (Edmans et 
al., 2014), which provides a proxy for liquidity. The results are generally not 
supportive of this explanation. Abnormal trading volume was found to be 
increasing immediately before analyst recommendations are made and then 
decreasing afterwards. This would suggest that insiders might find it easier to 
facilitate their trades directly before analyst recommendations rather than 
afterwards. They may not anticipate the recommendation but the liquidity 
itself is observable. Amihud’s (2002) measure for illiquidity also implies that 
the pre-recommendation period has higher liquidity level than the post-
recommendation period. Overall, this fails to support the notion that insiders 
trade after an analyst recommendation due to higher stock liquidity. 
In order to investigate the second and third explanations, relating to political 
cover and simple market timing respectively, I split trades made by insiders 
around analyst recommendations into two categories: trades that were 
consistent with analyst recommendations and contrarian trades. Consistent 
trades are those which were undertaken in the same direction as analyst 
recommendations. Contrarian trades are those that were opposite to what the 
analyst recommended. Of all insider trades identified, 17% of the total 
happened around the time of analyst recommendations. 40% of these were 
consistent trades and 60% were contrarian trades. Therefore, the ratio between 
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the number of consistent trades against the number of contrarian trades is 3:4, 
with the majority being against analyst recommendations. 
My results also provide evidence that political cover may be a possible reason 
for this trading activity around analyst events. This is because I also found that 
insiders place more consistent trades after analyst recommendations than 
before the recommendations. For example, when a given analyst 
recommendation is to ‘buy’, opportunistic2 insiders place 25% more ‘buy’ 
trades in the period immediately after the analyst recommendation than in the 
period before the recommendation. When the analyst recommendation is to 
‘sell’, however, opportunistic insiders place 100% more “sell” trades after the 
analyst recommendation than before the recommendation. If the trades that 
take place in the period after analyst recommendations, therefore, for any 
reason fall under suspicion as being based on illegal use of non-public 
information, insiders could defend themselves, as Raj Rajaratnam did in 2009, 
by using the nature of the analyst recommendation as political ‘cover’. 
However, it must also be recognized that, by waiting for such a consistent 
analyst recommendation, insiders might have lost some of their information 
advantage, so there could be a cost. I find that the level of abnormal profit for 
consistent trades after analyst recommendation is significantly lower than that 
before the recommendation. 
To provide additional evidence on the political cover explanation, I use firm’s 
lawsuit as proxy for firm level litigation risk (Lowry and Shu, 2002). I find 
that the fact that insiders place more consistent trades after analyst 
                                                     
2 Following Cohen et al. (2012), I classify insiders into routine and opportunistic insiders. 
Routine insiders place their trade regularly in the same particular month for several years. 
Opportunistic insiders strategically place their trades. 
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recommendations than before these recommendations is positively associated 
with the firm litigation risk. However, insiders’ behavior in placing more 
contrarian trades is not significantly related to firm litigation risk. I interpret 
this result to imply that, in a firm with higher litigation risk, insiders could be 
more cautious and attempt to take advantage of political cover. 
 I employ two further experiments, based on regulation changes, to provide 
supplementary evidence of political cover. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 10b-5 Act of 2000 suggested an alternative way in which 
insiders might provide affirmative evidence that they are not trading on non-
public information. The Act enables insiders to set up advance trading plans in 
conjunction with recognized agents. These amount to readily available 
affirmative evidence for insiders to defend these pre-plan trades. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 exogenously increases insiders’ litigation 
risk by shortening the relevant reporting period. I find that the pattern of 
consistent trades around analyst recommendations was weaker after SEC 10b-
5 Act and stronger after SOX. However, there was no significant effect on the 
trading pattern of contrarian trades. This is evidence that suggests that insiders’ 
preference for more consistent trades, after analyst recommendations than 
before the recommendations, is very probably related to the fact that insiders 
are motivated to use analyst recommendations as a form of political cover. 
Finally, I find that the market reaction to trades made by insiders, in the post-
recommendation period, was 0.4% lower than the equivalent reaction, in the 
pre-recommendation period. This is important because, in reality, regulators 
employ a range of techniques and tools to detect suspicious trading activities. 
If the market over-reacts to some particular trades, then an alert will be 
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triggered. In this way, insiders may fall under investigation if they are 
involved in the alerted trades. The low market reaction to the trades made by 
insiders after analyst recommendations implies that there is less probability of 
being detected, based on the market reaction, by the SEC; this could possibly 
reduce insiders’ litigation risk. This is consistent with the notion that insiders 
use analyst recommendation as a political ‘cover’.  
My findings also imply that market timing is a further possible source of 
motivation for insiders who trade in the period immediately after analyst 
recommendations. This is because insiders place more contrarian trades 
immediately after analyst recommendations than before the recommendations. 
For example, relative to before the analyst recommendation publication, 
opportunistic insiders frequently seem to place more buys after a downgrading 
recommendation is released and place more sells after an upgrading 
recommendation is released. This shows that insiders are using a contrarian 
strategy to time their trades around analyst recommendations. In addition, the 
abnormal profit level from such trades is higher during the post-
recommendation period than during the pre-recommendation period for 
contrarian trades. This suggests that insiders benefit significantly from their 
timing strategy. Insiders are clearly being given an incentive to trade 
immediately after an analyst recommendation and, in particular, to trade 
against what the analyst in question recommends.  
I use a logit model to investigate further how insiders base their decisions on 
political cover or market timing. Due to data constraints, I focus on one 
particular insider category, namely Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), to 
conduct a subsample analysis.  I find that overconfident CEOs, and high 
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tenure CEOs, are more likely to place a higher number of contrarian trades as 
opposed to consistent trades in the period after analyst recommendations are 
made. The result implies that overconfident CEOs might not identify political 
cover as a major concern in instigating their trades. This is consistent with the 
finding, of Malmendier and Tate (2005), that overconfident CEOs 
characteristically exhibit higher levels of risk taking. For high tenure CEOs, 
who have more trading experience and better understanding on their stock 
than relatively recently appointed CEOs, there is a higher likelihood that they 
will adopt a market timing strategy. 
Overall, I find little support for the idea that insiders trade around analyst 
recommendations in order to take advantage of increased liquidity. My 
findings suggest instead that insiders’ behavior after analyst recommendation 
is related to the motivation of political cover or market timing. The existence 
of overconfidence, as well as relative experience of the insiders, could affect 
insiders’ trading decisions around analyst recommendations. 
This paper makes several contributions to the academic understanding of 
insider trading behavior. First, this is the only paper to date that sets out to 
identify and analyze trading behavior of insiders specifically in the period 
around analyst recommendations. In previous research, insiders’ trading 
decisions mainly reflect company policies on insider trading, as opposed to 
insiders’ individually-motivated behavior. As a result of the relative lack of 
restrictions imposed by firms on insider trading around analyst 
recommendation points, my study is able to attenuate the effect of firm’s 
policy, and instead focus on developing an understanding of selfish trading 
behavior from an insiders’ perspective. Secondly, this paper provides 
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additional insight about the impact of different governmental regulations on 
insider trading behavior. It complements the literature in this respect regarding 
the nature of insiders’ responses to changes in regulation that govern their 
activity. My research also partially addresses an open question existing in 
literature: whether the documented shifts in insiders’ trade patterns, caused by 
regulation change, result from decisions made by firms to forbid trade 
opportunities in order to reduce overall firm litigation risk, or from decisions 
by risk-averse insiders facing increased litigation risk. Lastly, my research also 
enhances our general understanding of the relationship between analyst 
recommendations and trading by insiders. Whether analyst recommendations 
follow insider trading or vice versa remains controversial
3
. This paper 
contributes to this scholarly debate, providing particular insight, from a special 
angle, and implying that analyst recommendations do play an important role in 
shaping insiders’ trading decisions. 
  
                                                     
3 Hsieh et al. (2005) suggest that analyst recommendations affect trading decisions by insiders, 
but that such insider decisions are not a significant driver of analyst recommendations. 
Conversely, Coles et al. (2006) argue that insider trades are more informed trades, and that 
analysts may follow them in an attempt to take advantage of information possessed by insiders. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
The scholarly literature looks into insiders’ trading behavior mainly through 
examination of trading behavior in the period before corporate disclosure 
events. However, existing studies have reached mixed points of view in 
examining the relationship between insider trades and such corporate events. 
Givoly and Palmon (1985), for instance, do not find a strong association 
between trades made by insiders and subsequent reports of earnings 
announcements in the Wall Street Journal.  Noe (1999) also identifies no 
correlation between insider trades and subsequent management forecast 
accuracy. In a similar way, Lustgarten and Mande (1995) show that insiders 
buy more undervalued stocks in the immediate month before earnings 
announcements, but provide no conclusive evidence overall for insider 
trading.  
Roulstone (2004), however, finds a significant level of association between 
trades made by insiders and earnings announcements in the 2 months interval 
before the announcements. Huaddart et al. (2007) document the fact that 
insiders make trades most heavily in the period after earnings announcements 
and obtain profit from subsequent 10-k and 10-Q fillings. However, corporate 
events, like earning announcements, where foreknowledge of sensitive 
information could obviously be hugely helpful to insiders, and kept are under 
company control, especially by restrictions on insider trading around the 
release of these events.  
The literature has also shown how, stimulated by regulatory reform, company 
policies on insider trading have become more stringent in tackling potential 
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insider trading in recent years. Bettis et al. (2000) demonstrates, for example, 
that the use of blackout periods, which are designed to prevent insider trading, 
has increased in the period since 1990. Therefore, the absence of any insider 
trading pattern, surrounding corporate disclosure events, might be a reflection 
of changes in corporate policy on the area of insider trading.  
The trading behavior of company insiders is, of course, regulated by national 
laws as well as by individual corporate policies. Seyhun (1992) has studied the 
impact of regulatory changes in this area, documenting, in the period since 
passage of Insider Trading Sanction Act (ITSA) (1984), a lower frequency of 
buying ahead of positive earnings surprises, and of selling ahead of negative 
surprises. Garfinkel (1997) also illustrates a consistent reduction in timely 
trading in the period subsequent to passage of the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA).  
Robbins (2008) has found that the presence of publicly announced 10b5-1 
plans (established in the SEC 10b5-1 Act of 2000) is generally associated with 
insider trading. Jagolinzer and Roulstone (2009) have investigated the impact 
of the SEC 10b5-1 Act on insider trading patterns around earnings 
announcements. They claim that passage of the regulation has had a positive 
impact in reducing insider trading patterns, because that there are now fewer 
trades initiated before earnings announcements. Brochet (2014) shows that 
filings of insider trades have risen significantly in volume in the period after 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). However, none of these studies has been able 
to determine whether the documented shifts in the trading behavior of insiders 
are the consequence of company decisions to forbid or blackout trading 
opportunities, in order to reduce overall firm litigation risk, or alternatively the 
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consequence of decisions by risk-averse insiders themselves when facing 
increased litigation risk.   
Insiders are believed to have the ability to time the market to their advantage. 
Indeed existing studies in this area have provided robust evidence that insiders 
are better informed than normal investors (Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986), 
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003), Ke et al. (2003), Jiang and Zaman 
(2010) and Cohen et al. (2012)). This information advantage allows insiders to 
wait for better timing points to make their trades and thereby adopt a 
contrarian strategy (Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).  
Insiders also have an incentive to trade since they are often in the position of 
holding too many undiversified assets. However, it is also true that they may 
have liquidity concerns when they execute the trades. Edmans et al. (2014) 
have shown that insiders strategically time corporate news releases to facilitate 
their trades in the vested month. They thereby take advantage of the way in 
which media coverage captures investors’ attention, thereby providing an 
opportunity for insiders to cash out from their trades. This implies that insiders 
could also make use of analyst recommendations which are released with high 
market attention.  
Finally, there is a controversy within the literature over the nature of the 
relationship between insider trading and analyst recommendations. Hsieh et al. 
(2005) evaluate the information content of analyst recommendations and 
information on trading by insiders and investigate the relative and combined 
investment value of the two data sources. They find that analyst 
recommendations help determine insider trading decisions, but that there is no 
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reverse affect. Conversely, Coles et al. (2006) argue that insider trades are 
more informed trades, and suggest that they may be influential, therefore, in 
helping to shape the content of analyst assessments.  
Both insider trading and analyst recommendation represent a long-term 
prediction of firm’s future cash flow. However, there is no direct evidence that 
the information gained from analyst recommendations can, in this sense at 
least, be considered a useful information source for insiders. It seems that 
analysts’ role is a marketing one, in which they re-package already available 
public information (Easley et al. (1998), Roulstone (2003), and Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004)). Analysts might be experts in analyzing market-wide or 
industry-wide information (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) but they will tend 




Chapter 3. Data 
3.1 Data Source and Sample 
The data sample, which forms the basis of this research, consists of an 
amalgam created from a number of sources.  Insider trading data is provided 
by Thomson Reuters; analyst recommendations data is from the Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S); data on company characteristics is by 
Compustat, and hand-collected security lawsuit data is from Clearinghouse
4
.  I 
merge all this data with daily stock return information, from the Center for 
Research in Security Price (CRSP). Non-missing values for all variables are 
required in order to facilitate multivariate regression analysis. 
Insider trading data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Insider Filings (Form 
4), data, which was reported in accordance with the insiders’ disclosure 
requirements contained in Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Act of 1934. The sample period is from 1989-2012. The 
data contains information on each insider trade transaction and each insider’s 
relationship to the firm. I exclusively focus on insiders’ open market sales and 
open market purchases (Cohen et.al. 2012), and exclude option grants and 
excises as well as private transactions. Insider trades are aggregated at a daily 
level by multiplying ‘-1’ with all ‘sell’ transactions. Whether the trade is ‘buy’ 
(or ‘sell’) is determined by net buy (or net sale) of all the daily trades. 
Analyst recommendation data is taken from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) ‘Detail’ Section, which contains a full catalog of individual 
analyst recommendations data from 2,085 brokerage houses with around 




53,533 analysts. The available data period in this case is from 1993-2012
5
. 
The level of recommendations are ranked on a 5 point scale: ‘1’ is ‘strong 
buy’; ‘2’ is ‘buy’; ‘3’ is ‘hold’; ‘4’ is ‘sell’; and ‘5’ is ‘strong sell’. I aggregate 
these recommendations to identify daily levels for each stock. A higher value 
of the daily recommendation, of course, represents a less favorable view on 
the part of analysts. In order to avoid any effect from earnings announcements 
(e.g. blackout period restrictions from firm’s policy), I also omit the sample 
data point in any case where an earnings announcement event occurs within 7 
days of the given recommendations.  This means that around 3.6% sample is 
deleted. 
Security lawsuit data is derived from Clearinghouse, ranging from 1996-2012. 
I hand collected the lawsuit data for each company, identifying each firm’s 
permanent number (PERMNO) using ticker.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1A provides descriptive statistics on the sample of both insider data and 
analyst recommendation data
6
. The sample consists of a universe of 5,910 
firms, which is the figure for an average year, during the period between 1993 
and 2012. Within this combined sample, for each company there were, on 
average, 3.4 analyst reports each year with 4.7 analyst recommendations and 
3.78 insiders covered, who made an average of 10.9 recorded trades annually. 
                                                     
5 The available raw data actually starts from 1992, but there is only 1 observation in that year, 
so I start my sample from 1993. 
6 It is quite possible that for some firms there is analyst data without insider data or vice versa, 
therefore the statistics of insider (analyst) data might be smaller than insider (analyst) 
literature that consider insider (analyst) data only. 
16 
 
The average number of insider trades per day is therefore 0.03
7
. Analyst 
recommendations are also aggregated at a daily level; if there were multiple 
recommendations made by a single analyst on a same day then they are 
aggregated as one observation. Insider trades are also aggregated at a daily 
level; where there are multiple transactions for an insider on a particular date, 
then this is aggregated as one trade. 
As can be seen in this table, the number of trades made by insiders is 
increasing every year, while the number of unique firms whose stock is 
involved starts to decrease after the year 2000. This could imply that, after 
insider trading litigation regulation became more stringent in the United States 
in 2000, with passage of the SEC 10b5-1 Act (Jagolinzer and Roulstone, 
2009), some firms adopted new policies to restrict insiders’ open market 
trades, thereby reducing the number of companies in the sample. However, in 
the case of those firms without restrictions on open market trades, insiders 
tended to place more trades, regardless of the enhanced litigation risk. Overall, 
this suggests that insiders either become less risk-averse or that they adopted 
strategies to deal with litigation risk. 
-------------------------Insert Table 1A here     ----------------------------------------- 
Table 1B sets out summary statistics for insider-year and firm-year level 
variables. In the insider-year category, all variables are aggregated at the 
insider-year level. On average, 17% of insider trades happen within 7 trading 
                                                     
7 10.9/365=0.0298 trades per day. The small number is because the sample is combined with 
analyst database possibly with a lot of zero values. 
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days before or after an analyst recommendation
8
. 40% more trades take place 
in the 7 day period after analyst recommendation compared to before the 
recommendations. . 
-------------------------Insert Table 1B here     ----------------------------------------- 
  
                                                     
8  To avoid ambiguity, I neglect those insider trades made between two analyst 
recommendations in the same period (1.5% of the sample).   
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Chapter 4. Main Results 
The results, which are set out in this chapter, are subdivided into several 
sections. Section 4.1 contains findings on insiders’ trading patterns during the 
period surrounding analyst recommendations. Section 4.2 demonstrates the 
extent of liquidity concern. Sections 4.3-4.6 relate to motivations connected to 
political cover and market timing. Section 4.7 addresses the overall matter of 
how insiders define their trading strategy around analyst recommendations. 
4.1 Trading Patterns around Analyst Recommendation  
In order to understand trading patterns around analyst recommendations, I 
focus mainly on the comparative trading frequency before and after analyst 
recommendations. Specifically, I considered the number of insider trades that 
took place within a short-term period (i.e. 7 trading days) on either side of 
analyst recommendations. Insider trades are aggregated, at a daily level, by 
multiplying all the ‘sell’ transactions by ‘-1’ to produce a positive number. If, 
in aggregate, the daily insider trades for a given stock, consist of more ‘buys’ 
than ‘sells’, then this is determined to be a ‘buy’ in terms of insiders’ daily 
trading. Similarly, if there are more ‘sells’ than ‘buys’, the daily trade is 
allocated as a ‘sell’ for the purpose of my analysis. .  
Table 2 shows the difference between the number of insider trades that took 
place in the 7 day period before and after analyst recommendations. On 
average, according to the first row of figures in Panel A, insiders make 26.8% 
more trades during the immediate period after analyst recommendations, 
compared to during the period before them. The difference and significance, 
moreover, disappears in the second row of this panel to which a Placebo test is 
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applied. This involves randomly assigning the announcement date of analyst 
recommendations (the analyst recommendation release date is generated by a 
uniformly distributed random generator)
9
. The result of Placebo test is further 
evidence that the trading pattern around analyst recommendations does in fact 
exist. 
-------------------------Insert Table 2 here     ------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 shows the trading pattern in the month surrounding analyst 
recommendations, with the y-axis showing the average number of insider 
trades per week.  From this data it is clear that, in the period preceding analyst 
recommendations, the overall number of trades does not change significantly; 
the trend between each weekly period appears as a flat curve. However, the 
number of trades sharply increases immediately after the analyst 
recommendation is made, decreasing gradually thereafter towards the previous 
norm. It seems that analyst recommendations act as a significant stimulus to 
trading by insiders. 
-------------------------Insert Figure 1 here    ------------------------------------------- 
To further investigate this phenomenon, Panel B and Panel C of Table 2 
consider the trading behavior of informed insiders around upgrading / 
downgrading analyst recommendations. If the current recommendation was 
identical to the previous recommendation made by the same analyst, then this 
recommendation is considered to be less informative. If the current 
recommendation is different from the same analyst’s most recent evaluation, 
then this recommendation is more informative (Womack, 1996). Informative 
                                                     
9 Another way is to use normal distributed generator. The results are consistent. 
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recommendations could be classified as either upgrading or downgrading 
recommendations.  
Informed insiders are the opportunistic insiders as defined in Cohen et al. 
(2012)
10
. I focus on opportunistic insiders in order to remove the distorting 
effect of routine insiders, who regularly place trades at a particular time point 
over several years. The two panels show that opportunistic insiders prefer 
placing their trades after analyst recommendations. In cases in which insiders 
follow analyst recommendations (i.e. sell when analysts downgrade or buy 
following an upgrade), between 20%-25%
11
 more trades are placed in the 
period after the recommendations than before the recommendations. However, 
insiders were found to sell a larger number of trades after an upgrading 
recommendation (77% more after than before the recommendation) and buy 
more after a downgrading recommendation (almost 100% more than before 
the recommendation). This suggests that some insiders are using a contrarian 
strategy (betting against analyst recommendations) and some are following a 
consistent strategy (following analyst recommendations). The trading pattern, 
overall however, is more strongly in support of in a contrarian strategy than a 
consistent strategy. All the differences and significance also disappear in the 
Placebo tests in these two panels. 
                                                     
10 Cohen et al. (2012) classified insiders as routine insiders if these insiders make at least one 
trade in the same months for three consecutive years. If insiders are not classified as routine 
insiders, then they are classified as opportunistic insiders. Their paper shows that 
opportunistic insiders have better prediction power on firm’s future cash flows, which 
apparently indicates that they benefit from non-public information.  
11 The number is obtained by dividing the difference by the numbers of trades before the 
analyst recommendation. For example, 0.006/0.032≈20% 
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4.2 Trading Patterns and Liquidity Concerns 
The previous section documents trading patterns in the period surrounding 
analyst recommendations. In this section, I seek to determine whether the need 
to pursue liquidity is a significant reason behind the identified trading pattern. 
Stocks become more liquid when the market reacts to public news, making it 
easier to place trades. Insiders, who are concerned about the liquidity of their 
investments, may therefore trade in the period after analyst recommendations 
in order to take advantage of the increased liquidity.  
I use two measures as a proxy for liquidity. The first measure, following 
Edmans et al. (2014), is the daily abnormal trading volume, which is the daily 
trading volume of shares sold minus the average trading volume over the dates 
[-60,-31], divided by the number of shares outstanding, and excludes the 
insiders’ own trades. The second measure is the inverse of illiquidity. Stock 
illiquidity is defined, following Amihud (2002), as the average ratio of the 
daily absolute return, divided by the (dollar) trading volume on that day, i.e.  
|Riyd|
Voliyd
 , where |Riyd| is the return on stock i on day d of year y, and Voliyd is 
the respective daily volume in dollars. This ratio gives the absolute 
(percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily price 
impact of the order flow.  
Figure 4 shows the weekly liquidity level in the period surrounding analyst 
recommendations, following Edmans et al. (2014). Figure 5, which takes 
Amihud’s (2002) measure as its starting point, shows the illiquidity curve. 
Both figures show that liquidity in the week preceding analyst 
recommendations was higher than liquidity in the subsequent week. This is 
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inconsistent with any attempt to explain the trading pattern, shown in Figure 1, 
as the result for a search for liquidity; Figure 1 illustrates the fact that insiders’ 
trades increase in the week subsequent to analyst publications. The 
inconsistency implies that a quest for liquidity is not the main motivation 
underpinning the trading strategy of insiders during the recommendation 
period.  
-------------------------Insert Figure 4 here     ------------------------------------------ 
-------------------------Insert Figure 5 here     ----------------------------------------- 
Besides, I also run regression of the difference of illiquidity on the pre-analyst 
recommendation period and the period across the event
12
. I find no difference 
between the slope of pre-analyst recommendation and the slope across analyst 
recommendation. Therefore, it is unlikely for insiders to take advantage of the 
liquidity around analyst recommendation. 
4.3 Correlation between Trading Patterns and Firm Litigation Risk 
Firm level litigation risk includes illegal insider trading activity as a key 
component (Johnson et al., 2006).  Therefore, it is presumably the case that a 
higher volume of insiders’ trades should be associated with higher level of risk 
for the firm overall. This section will consider the relationship between firm-
level litigation risk and insider trading patterns. 
I split trades that take place in the period surrounding analyst 
recommendations into two categories: those that are consistent trades and 
contrarian trades. Consistent trades are those that are consistent with analyst 
recommendations. If analyst recommendations are to ‘buy’, then consistent 
                                                     
12 It is a simple OLS regression. I omit the result table for compactness. 
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trades are those ‘buy’ transactions that take place. Alternatively, contrarian 
trades are trades that are opposite to analyst recommendations. I use the 
following specifications: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒)
= 𝛽0𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡; 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒)
= 𝛽0𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡; 
Table 3 shows the OLS regression analysis of insiders’ trading behavior, 
around the time of analyst recommendations, and firm litigation risk. The 
dependent variable, Number of Trades (After-Before), is equal to the number 
of insiders’ trades after analyst recommendations minus the number of trades 
before the recommendations in each year. Column 1 is for consistent trades 
and Column 2 is for contrarian trades. Firm Litigation Risk is set to one, if the 
company suffered any lawsuit in previous year, and zero otherwise.  
The results suggest a significant association between firm litigation risk and 
the number of consistent trades. However, there appears to be no significant 
relationship between the number of contrarian trades and firm litigation risk. 
This is consistent with the political cover story. Higher firm litigation risk is 
related to a higher level of consistent trades, after analyst recommendation, in 
view of the fact that these trades could be ‘covered’ by the recommendations 
and analyst reports. The purpose of contrarian trades, however, is to time the 
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market and gain more benefit. So it is possible that contrarian trading patterns 
are not related to the level of firm litigation risk.  
-------------------------Insert Table 3 here     ------------------------------------------- 
4.4 Trading Patterns and Changes of Insider Trading Regulations 
The previous section documented a possible relationship between insiders’ 
trading decisions, in the time period surrounding publication of analyst 
recommendations, and litigation risk. In this section, I use two further 
experiments to provide additional evidence of the motivation underpinning 
insider trading patterns. Specifically, I aim to test whether, in general, insiders 
trading patterns, around analyst recommendations, have evolved in response to 
changes in government regulations. There were two regulation changes, 
relating to insider trading, during my sample period: the SEC 10b5-1 Act 
(2000) and the SOX Act (2002). In order to determine whether these 
regulation changes had an impact on insider trader behavior, I conduct two 
diff-in-mean tests, timed for 1 year before and 1 year after each reform. I also 
separately consider consistent trades and contrarian trades. 
In Table 4, I aggregate the number of insider trades, that took place, within a 7 
day period, before and after analyst recommendations, during the course of 
each year, and divide it by the total number of insider trades that took place in 
that year. Firstly, consistent trades are investigated in Panel A1-A2.  In 2001, 
for example, around 3.7% of the year’s insiders’ consistent trades were placed 
in the 7 day period after analyst recommendations, and only 3.5% of insider 
trades were placed in the 7 day period immediately before recommendations. 
The difference (0.2%) is significant. This implies the existence of a pattern of 
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consistent trades in that year; i.e. insiders still prefer to trade after analyst 
recommendations and in a way that is consistent with these recommendations. 
However, what is most interesting to compare this pattern with the situation in 
1999, before the enactment of the SEC 10b5-1 Act.  In 1999, the comparable 
difference in favor of consistent trades was 0.6%, which is higher. This clearly 
conflicts with the findings of Jagolinzer and Roulstone (2009), which 
suggested that the trading pattern around earnings announcements is stronger 
after this act.  
My interpretation of this finding is that the SEC 10b5-1 Act provided a pre-
planned trading strategy allowing insiders to avoid litigation risk. Under the 
terms of the act, insiders could set up trading plans, with brokers or agents 
well in advance of the actual moment of purchase, and the existence of these 
trading plans could be used as affirmative evidence that insiders are not 
trading illegally on the basis of inside information. This facilitated an 
alternative method (as opposed to provision of analyst recommendation 
political cover) to mitigate the danger of litigation, in cases where suspicion of 
illegal insider trading arises. This allowed the use of analyst recommendations 
or reports as political cover to become less frequent.  
The Act also, however, signaled the existence of a more stringent company 
level litigation risk (rather than insider’s litigation risk) environment that 
shifted regulators’ focus on insider trading. Therefore it could be the case that, 
as a result of this renewed alert to firms of the dangers to them posed by 
insider trading, they decided to place more restrictions on insider’s activities 
themselves (for example by instigating blackout periods before corporate 
earnings announcements).  
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-------------------------Insert Table 4 here     ------------------------------------------- 
The insiders’ trading pattern of consistent trades was significantly stronger 
after another regulation change in 2002, this being the SOX Act. In fact, there 
was a 0.6% increment in the relevant trading pattern after 2002. This would be 
because the litigation risk was increasing. Before the SOX Act, insiders had to 
report to the SEC on their trades, no later than 10 days after the month when 
these trades took place. In other words, depending on the exact phasing of the 
trade within a given month, insiders could choose to report to the SEC within 
a period that was potentially as high as 40 days. However, as a result of the 
SOX Act, the new insider trading report period requirement was shortened, 
with notification to be made to the SEC in all cases within just 2 days.  
This change had a significant impact.  Previously, before 2002, the extended 
reporting time delay meant that anomalous insider trading would only be 
detected and investigated by the SEC’s self-regulated organizations (SROs), 
and there was no means by which the market could know immediately about 
the insider’s trading activities. But the fact that the SOX Act requires trades to 
be reported within 2 days means that the market itself may come to act in the 
role of detector. Therefore, the Act enhances the probability of those 
responsible for illegal insider trading being detected or coming under 
suspicion, and thus enhances the litigation risk, increasing the level of 
motivation to seek political cover to such actions. My finding is evidence that 
insiders’ trading decisions, to trade in the immediate aftermath of analyst 




For contrarian trades, which are set out in Panel B1-B2, the regulation changes 
have had no identified effect on trading patterns. Thus, there could be other 
reasons for insiders making their trading decisions, in this case, that are 
distinct from the need to achieve political cover. 
Figure 2 illustrates the proportions of insider trades occurring before and after 
analyst recommendations for each year surveyed. It is clear that the 
differences in the proportion of trades falling before and after the 
recommendations marginally decreases, between 2000 to 2001, and then 
sharply increases from 2002. Thereafter, the trading pattern remains stable. 
This implies that the effect of regulation in this case is important. 
-------------------------Insert Figure 2 here     ------------------------------------------ 
4.5 Market Reactions of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation 
In reality, insider trading is monitored mainly using the detection system for 
Self-regulated Organizations (SROs) administered by the SEC. If the market 
overreacts to insiders’ trades, this system will raise an alert, thereby triggering 
an investigation. Therefore, it is important to see how the market reacts 
differently to the insiders’ trades before and after analyst recommendations. I 
achieve this by measuring market reaction using the absolute value of two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns, from the insider trading day to next day. 
Abnormal returns are computed using a 4-factor market model, that 
incorporates the 3-factor system of Fama French (Fama and French, 1993), as 
well as a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). 
Specifically, the following timing series regression is used: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1[𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡] + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                           (1)                                                 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of the stock i on day t, and 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the risk free rate at this point 
(i.e. return on a three-month T-bill) .  𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market return (i.e. equally 
weighed S&P500 return). SMB (Small Minus Big) is the difference of 
portfolio returns for small firms versus large firms during the pre-event period 
(255 trading days). HML (High Minus Low) is the difference between average 
returns on high book-to-market equity portfolios compared to that on low 
book-to-market equity portfolios. UMD (Up Minus Down) is Carhart’s price-
momentum factor, based on pre-event period momentum in returns; this is the 
difference between the average return on high as opposed to low prior pre-
event period return portfolios. 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the OLS regression. 
 𝛽𝑖1, 𝛽𝑖2,𝛽𝑖3  and  𝛽𝑖4 are coefficients used to measure the sensitivity of each 
factor. The abnormal return is  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅                                                                                                      (2)                                                                                                                
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  is estimated from the above 4 factor model (1).  
Table 5 presents the market reaction to trades made by insiders during the 14-
day period surrounding analyst recommendations. The first two columns detail 
insider sales; the third and fourth columns relate to insider buys; the last two 
columns cover all trades.  It is shown that the market reaction to any trade 
made before analyst recommendation publications is stronger than that to 
trades made subsequent to recommendations. Indeed, the magnitude of the 
reaction difference is economically meaningful (0.4% on average for one 
trade). Since this overreaction in terms of stock price movement might cause 
alerts from insider trading detection systems, and thereby increase litigation 
risk, the lower post-recommendation market reaction provides a significant 
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incentive for insiders to place their trades at this point in time, after 
recommendations are made public.  
-------------------------Insert Table 5 here     ------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 illustrates a general view on the market reactions for insider trading 
in the 7-days before and after analyst recommendations for each year. It is 
clear that, in general, the post analyst recommendation period shows weaker 
market reaction than the pre-recommendation period. This suggests that 
analyst recommendations could serve the purpose of providing a safe harbor 
for insiders to attenuate the potential for adverse regulators’ attention. 
-------------------------Insert Figure 3 here     ------------------------------------------ 
4.6 Abnormal Profits of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation 
In the case of trades made subsequent to consistent analyst recommendations, 
it is clear that insiders’ private information could effectively be partially 
disclosed by the publication of analysts’ reports. Therefore, insiders might 
sacrifice their information advantage for trades made after analyst 
recommendations; certainly the abnormal level of return of each trade for 
insiders, in this case, is expected to be lower. However, in the case of 
contrarian trades, insiders have bought or sold against the prevailing trend of 
analyst recommendations. In these circumstances, insiders could make a profit 
if the market is misled by misguided analyst reports.  
To examine this area, I construct an abnormal profit figure for each trade, 
which is the abnormal return on the trading day, multiplied by -1 in the case of 
insider sales. I aggregate the abnormal profits for all the trades within the 7-
days before and after analyst recommendations in Table 6. As previously 
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stated, abnormal returns are computed based on a 4-factor model that includes 
the 3-factor considered by Fama and French (Fama and French,1993), as well 
as a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). 
-------------------------Insert Table 6 here     ------------------------------------------- 
Panel A and B in this table both show that, on average, insiders can earn 
positive abnormal profits; this is consistent with the notion that insiders have 
an information advantage that enables them to outperform the market. 
However, with consistent trades, the abnormal profit is significantly lower in 
the post-recommendation period than during the pre-recommendation period. 
This suggests that insiders are paying a financial price for the political cover 
provided by analyst recommendations. Conversely, for contrarian trades, the 
insiders’ post-recommendation abnormal profits are higher than pre-
recommendation abnormal profits. This shows that insiders are making use of 
a contrarian strategy to drive profit upwards, as is consistent with the market 
timing explanation. 
4.7 Trading Strategies and CEO Characteristics  
Political cover and market timing are therefore two very different strategies 
used by insiders to address different concerns. However, it is still unclear how 
insiders select between these two approaches.  
I apply a logit regression analysis to test the preference of insiders. Due to data 
constraints, I focus on a particular type of insider, i.e. CEOs, considering a 





= 𝛽0𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡; 
The dependent variable Market Timing is a dummy variable; it is equal to one, 
if a CEO places more contrarian trades than consistent trades after analyst 
recommendations, and equal to zero otherwise, in a given year. Overconfident 
is a dummy variable, equal to one if a CEO’s yearly exercisable (but as yet 
unexercised) option moneyness
13
 is larger than 67%, and zero otherwise 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005). High Tenure is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the tenure of the CEO is larger than the sample mean figure for tenure. I also 
control for other CEO characteristics, such as gender, salary and bonus level. 
Firm characteristics consist of return of assets (ROA), firm size, last year’s 
stock return and sales.  
-------------------------Insert Table 7 here     ------------------------------------------- 
Table 7 shows that overconfident CEOs and high tenure CEOs are more likely 
to place a higher number of contrarian trades than consistent trades. The result 
implies that overconfident CEOs might not regard political cover as a major 
concern in their trading behavior. This is consistent with the finding of 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), who suggest that overconfident CEOs are risk 
taking. For high tenure CEOs, who have more trading experience and better 
                                                     
13  I define the moneyness for exercisable options (those that have not exercised) as the 
realizable value, per option, divided by the estimated average exercise price. The realizable 
value per option is the average value of the total realizable exercisable options, (i.e., 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL/OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM in ExecuComp), and the 
estimated average exercise price (for the presently unexercised option) is equal to the stock 




understanding on their stock than young CEOs, the result implies that they are 




Chapter 5. Robustness Checks and Other Tests 
In this section, I first conduct two robustness checks on the trading pattern that 
was identified in this paper. Alternative tests are thereafter presented, which 
have particularly interesting results concerning the identified trading pattern. 
5.1 Robustness Checks 
The first robustness check involved extending the period of analysis, from 
coverage of 7 trading days before and after the analyst recommendations, to 
coverage of a 14 trading day period before and after. The second was to use 
trading volume (thereby reflecting the financial value of trades) rather than 
trading frequency.  
Within Appendix B, Panel A shows that the insiders’ trading pattern, 
identified in this thesis, still occurs when analysis is extended over a more 
extended timeframe (i.e. 14 days before/after analyst recommendations). Panel 
B shows a similar trading pattern exists when the alternative measure (trading 
volume) for insiders’ activity is used. Trading volume is a ratio between the 
number of shares traded by insiders, divided by the share outstanding of the 
stock. The value of this ratio is multiplied by 1000. It is clear that insiders 
trade not only more frequently, in the period after analyst recommendations, 
but also trade in larger volumes. 
Last, I also remove the effect from management forecast and multiple analyst 
recommendations. Specifically, I neglect those analyst recommendations 
happen within 7-days around a management forecast and I also neglect those 
multiple analyst recommendations happen in the same day. I find fairly similar 
trading patterns and consistent results.  
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5.2 Trading Patterns and High versus Low Litigation Risk Industries 
I also set out to see if insiders’ trading behavior around analyst 
recommendations varied between sectors in the economy. Specifically, I 
looked into the variation of trading patterns between high and non-high 
litigation risk industries. The classification of high litigation risk industries 
follows prior studies (e.g., Shu (2000), Johnson et al. (2001), Rogers and 
Stocken (2005), Field et al. (2005)). Specifically, firms that operate in the 
fields of bio-technology (SIC code 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), electronics 
(SIC codes 3600-3674), computing (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), 
and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961), have been identified as being more likely 
to suffer from higher litigation risk than other firms. I define the remaining 
industries as low (or non-high) litigation risk industries. 
Appendix C sets out my findings in this area. Around 25% of the sample is 
classified as high-litigation risk industry. Both high and low litigation risk 
industries have the same significant trading pattern, in that insiders prefer to 
trade after analyst recommendations. Specifically, in low litigation risk 
industries, this insiders’ trading pattern exists in 11.9% of the 
recommendations, while 9.2% of recommendations have the opposite pattern, 
which leaves a significant 2.7% difference. However, this difference effect is 
slightly stronger in high litigation risk industries, although the difference not 
particularly large in economic sense (0.4%). This suggests that, in high 
litigation risk industries, insiders are more likely to trade after analyst 
recommendations. The result implies that insiders’ trading patterns around 
analyst recommendations might be associated with litigation risk at an 
industry level.   
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There is, admittedly, a potential sample selection issue. On the one hand, 
Seyhun (1986) reports that the level of insider trading varies according to firm 
size; it is possible that high litigation risk industries have different firm 
characteristics, in this respect, than low litigation risk industries. On the other 
hand, larger firms could have more analysts following them and, therefore, 
more analyst recommendations; this might increase the proportion difference 
in a larger unit so that the Diff-in-Diff test could contain bias. To address the 
problem, I operate a matching sample procedure. I use the P-score nearest 
neighbor matching method, based on firm characteristics. Specifically, I 
estimate the propensity from the following logit model specification: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) = 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡; 
The dependent variable is equal to one, as a treatment group, if the company is 
in a high-litigation risk industry, and zero, as a control group, if the company 
is in a low litigation risk industry. The resulting sample contains a more 
homogeneous group of firms with comparable firm characteristics. As shown 
in the rest of the table, the results are consistent. 
5.3 Trading Patterns and High versus Low Scrutiny Firms 
I also look into the potential for differences between what are known as 
high/low scrutiny firms (high scrutiny firms are those that attract high levels of 
business media attention). In Appendix D, I use S&P1500 index firms as a 
proxy for high scrutiny firms. This is because firms in S&P1500 index capture 
greater levels of media attention and are more closely scrutinized by 
regulatory authorities. Therefore, insiders within these firms are exposed to 
more litigation risk.  
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I divide S&P 1500 index firms into 3 categories, according to market 
capitalization: S&P500 (Large-Cap); S&P400 (Mid-Cap); and S&P600 
(Small-Cap). I also use a P-score matching method with firm characteristics to 
address any sample selection problem, in a similar way as in the previous 
section, using a change on the dependent variable (i.e. equal to one, as a 
treatment group, if the company is a high-scrutiny firms and zero, as a control 
group, otherwise). 
Results in this Table show that there is a stronger trading pattern for firms 
under higher levels of scrutiny. In the case of S&P 500 firms, for example, 
15% of analyst recommendations have more insider trades in the post-
recommendation period than in the pre-recommendation period; only 12% of 
analyst recommendations have more insider trades in the pre-recommendation 
period than during the post-recommendation period (difference is 3.1%). In 
the control group (Non-S&P1500 firms), 6.4% of analyst recommendations 
have more insider trades in the post-recommendation period than in the pre-
recommendation period; only 5% of analyst recommendations have more 
insider trades in the pre-recommendation period than in the post-
recommendation period (difference is 1.4%).  The Diff-in-mean test therefore 
shows that the timing effect is stronger (1.7%) in the case of S&P500 firms. 
The results still hold after matching based on firm characteristics and a year 
fixed dummy, using the P-score method. The results in this table imply that, 
when insiders are in a high-scrutiny trading environment, they prefer trading 
after analyst recommendations rather than before the recommendations. 
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5.4 Trading Patterns and Information Asymmetry between Insiders and 
Analysts 
I use the level of competitiveness of industries as a proxy for the information 
asymmetry between insiders and analysts. The reason for this proxy is 
straightforward. Analysts have market-wide or industry-wide information and 
are good at processing that information (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). In 
competitive industries, analysts find it easier to obtain firm-specific 
information from insiders’ peer firms. Therefore, analysts could potentially 
have a better level of knowledge, and insiders might own relatively less 
private information, than is the case in non-competitive industries. If insiders 
follow analysts’ recommendations for information concern, the trading pattern 
would be stronger in competitive industries than non-competitive industries. 
I use the Hirfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), based on the three-digit standard 
industry classification (SIC), as my main measure of the level of 
competition
14
; this is computed by using firms’ sales from Compustat (Giroud 
and Mueller, 2009).  A higher value of HHI represents a lower degree of 
competition. Specifically, HHI is defined as sum of the squared proportion of 






it represents industry i’s HHI in year j, with k as the firm’s index number in 
the industry.  
Appendix E shows the results for insider trading patterns in competitive 
industries, with the HHI categorized into 10 groups. In each group, I compute 
the relative proportion of trades made by insiders, which take place before and 
                                                     




after analyst recommendations. There are around 12% of cases of analyst 
recommendations when insiders’ preference is on trading after. Only 9% show 
an insider preference on trading before. This difference is significant,
15
 and at 
similar magnitude (3%), for each level of industry competitiveness. Moreover, 
the Diff-in-Diff test for the competitive versus non-competitive industry is not 
significant. This suggests that insiders’ trading behavior around analyst 
recommendations does not vary according to any difference in information 
asymmetry between analysts and insiders.   
5.5 Trading Patterns and Accuracy of Analysts 
It will be interesting to see if the contrasting reputations of individual analysts, 
for having high or low levels of insight and accuracy, affects insiders’ trading 
decisions around the time of their recommendations. It could be hypothesized 
that insiders would follow information from high-accuracy analysts thereby 
explaining the timing patterns.  
I compute the differing accuracy of analysts by using analyst share earnings 
forecast data. Specifically, accuracy for a given analyst is defined by 
|𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡−𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔|
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
, which is the absolute value of estimating error 
scaled by the actual earning level involved (so a high figure indicates 
relatively poor accuracy levels). I define an analyst as having high accuracy if 
his yearly accuracy average is below the median figure for other analysts; 
otherwise they are deemed to have low accuracy. The result is given in 
Appendix F.  
                                                     
15 The T-value is decreasing but this is due to the decreasing sample size of the groups. For 
example, the non-competitive industry sector contains a lower number of firms, so the 
standard deviation is larger and T-value is smaller. 
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In panel A, the full sample result implies that insiders would use the timing 
strategy more frequently in the case of analyst recommendations issued by a 
high accuracy analyst. However, this effect disappears in matching samples 
identified using a P-score method (Panel B). Therefore, the level of analyst 
accuracy does not seem to be an important driving force that explains trading 
patterns of insiders. 
5.6 Trading Patterns and Return Predictability 
This section provides further evidence that insiders’ trading patterns, around 
analyst recommendation points, do not suggest incorporation of superior 
information set out by analysts. Cohen et al. (2012) show that informed 
insiders have predictability power over the subsequent month’s stock return. If 
insiders’ trading patterns around analyst recommendations are related to the 
incorporation of information from analysts, then more insiders with trading 
patterns should have more predictability power on the next month return. 
Therefore, I use interaction terms to check whether the number of insiders 
with this trading strategy has any additional effect on predicting firm’s stock 
return. 
Appendix G shows that, for firms where there are opportunistic insiders 
present, the increasing numbers of strategic insiders, who trade in preference 
after rather than before analyst recommendations in a given month, does not 
increase the aggregate predicting power of these insiders when it comes to 
forecasting next month’s return.  This implies that the existence of this trading 
pattern does not imply the existence of additional information for informed 
insiders to predict stock return; insiders who trade following analyst 
recommendations do not get superior information from the analysts. 
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5.7 Correlation between Trading Patterns and Insiders Compensation 
The emphasis so far has been on explaining insiders’ training patterns, during 
the time period surrounding analyst recommendations. However, it is also 
potentially interesting to speculate about the company attitudes towards these 
trading patterns.  
Appendix B
16
 sets out the relationship between insiders’ trading patterns and 
their individual yearly compensation. The regression employs a subsample 
analysis, since compensation figures are only published for ‘top 5’ executives 
within the ExecuComp database. The specification, overall, is similar to that 
of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009). The dependent variable Total 
Compensation is the log of insiders’ total compensation (tdc1 in the 
ExecuComp database), which includes base salary, bonuses, options, and 
restricted stocks etc. #Trades After(Before) A.R. is the number of insider trades 
after (before) analyst recommendation in a calendar year. Strategy_Dummy is 
a dummy variable, equal to one if the total number of insider trades after 
analyst recommendations in one year outnumbers that before analyst 
recommendation, and equals to zero otherwise. There are several control 
variables, including both firm characteristic and insider characteristic 
variables. All independent variables are lagged one year.  
As seen in the table, the number of trades after analyst recommendation points 
is positively related to the next year total compensation for a given insider, 
while the number of trades before analyst recommendation points is not 
related. This is also positively significant. It implies that insiders with a 
                                                     




preference for trading after analyst recommendations are, on average, better 
compensated. This table, however, presents a correlation rather than a causal 
effect. There is a reverse causality problem here, in that higher levels of 





Chapter 6. Conclusion 
This paper examines insiders’ trading activities by considering the short period 
immediately surrounding publication of analyst recommendations. I find that, 
on average, insiders place 27% more trades in the 7 days directly after an 
analyst recommendation, than in the 7 days before. This trading pattern is, 
moreover, more in line with an explanation based on the need to achieve 
political cover or to take advantage of market timing, as opposed to any quest 
to take advantage of liquidity.  
I firstly test for liquidity concern, using the level of abnormal trading volume 
(Edmans et al., 2014) as a proxy for liquidity, in addition to the measure used 
by Amihud (2002). The results show that liquidity during the period 
immediately before analyst recommendations is higher than thereafter, which 
is not supportive of any significant role played by this concern in explaining 
the trading pattern.  
To understand the potential role of political cover and market timing, I split 
the trades into consistent trades and contrarian trades.  
My results provide significant support for the political cover rationale, where 
there are consistent trades. In the case of consistent trades, in the event that 
insiders fall under suspicion of illegal dealing, the analyst recommendations 
and reports could be used as affirmative evidence in the individual’s defense.  
In addition, the market reaction to insider trades, made after analyst 
recommendations, is lower than before the recommendations; this is 
significant because it means that these post-recommendation trades trigger less 
attention from the SEC and the public. More importantly, insiders’ trading 
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behavior in connection with consistent trades seems to have been affected by 
regulation changes over the years. The SEC 10b-5 Act provided an alternative 
means of achieving of political cover, and thus weakened the trading pattern 
of consistent trades. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, however, 
exogenously increased insiders’ litigation risk, increased the need for political 
cover, and thus strengthened the trading pattern of consistent trades.  
However, by trading after analyst recommendations with consistent trades, it 
should also be recognized that insiders might have lost at least some of their 
information advantage, so there could be a cost in this case. I find that the 
abnormal profit for consistent trades made after analyst recommendation is 
significantly lower than the equivalent profit would have been if the trade had 
been made before the recommendation.  
My findings also imply that market timing is a possible motivation for insiders 
who make contrarian trades after analyst recommendations. Insiders often 
seem to time their trades and place opposite trades to benefit from market 
heating-up or cooling-off in response to analyst comments. The abnormal 
profit potential of contrarian trades is higher in the post-recommendation 
period than in the pre-recommendation period.  
By using a subsample of a particular type of insider, i.e. CEOs, I find that 
overconfident CEOs and experienced CEOs are more likely to adopt market 
timing strategy than political cover strategy.  
I conduct several robustness checks: by extending the 7 days period before and 
after analyst publications, to 14 days; and by using trading volume, in my 
calculations, instead of trading frequency in order to show the trading pattern.  
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I also remove the effect from management forecast and multiple observations. 
These robustness checks reinforce and affirm the validity of my conclusions. 
There are also other findings. For example, the insiders’ trading pattern is 
apparently stronger within high-litigation risk industries and firms where there 
is a high level of media and market scrutiny. I also determine that variations of 
information asymmetry do not cause significant differences in insiders’ 
trading preferences around analyst recommendations. In addition, it appears 
that the timing of trading after analyst recommendations does not enhance the 
stock return prediction ability of opportunistic insiders. Moreover, whilst 
insiders initially appear to follow analysts, who have more accurate historical 
prediction records, this result does not remain valid after controlling for firm 
characteristics. Finally, I assess how companies treat insiders, who have 
particular identified trading preferences around analyst recommendations, in 
terms of compensation. I find that insiders, who prefer to trade after analyst 
recommendations, tend towards higher compensation, when compared to those 
who prefer to trade before analyst recommendations. But this result is the 
outcome of a correlation rather than any causal relationship.  
Overall, my findings suggest three potential explanations for insiders’ 
preference for trading in the period after analyst recommendations are 
published, and indicate that the pursuit for political cover and the desire to 
benefit from market timing and the most important of these. My paper thereby 
contributes to both the scholarly literature, on both insider behavior and 
analyst influence, providing a thoughtful insight on the relationship between 
insider trading and analyst recommendations during the most critical period 
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Figure 1. Number of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation 
This figure shows the average number of insider trades during the month around 
analyst recommendations. Each point represents the average number of insider trades 
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Figure 2. Proportion of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendations 
This figure shows, by year, the proportion of insider trades occurring before and after 

















Figure 3. Market Reactions of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendations 
The figure shows the market reactions in the 7 days interval, before and after analyst 
recommendation, for each year between 1993 and 2012. The market reaction is 
measured by the absolute value of two-day cumulative abnormal returns from the 

















Figure 4. Liquidity Curve 
This figure shows the average level of liquidity in the period around analyst 
recommendations. Liquidity is measured as the weekly average of abnormal trading 
volume around the analyst recommendation announcement day. The abnormal 
trading volume is the daily trading volume minus the average trading volume over [-
60,-31], divided by the number of shares outstanding, and excluding the insiders’ own 




























Figure 5. Illiquidity Curve 
This figure shows the weekly average of illiquidity around analyst recommendation 
announcement days. Stock illiquidity is defined, following Amihud (2002), as the 
average ratio of the daily absolute return, divided by the (dollar) trading volume on 
that day, i.e.  
|Riyd|
Voliyd
 , where |Riyd| is the return on stock i on day d of year y, and 
Voliyd  is the respective daily volume in dollars. This ratio gives the absolute 
(percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact 

























Table 1A. Summary Statistics for Combined Sample 
This table shows yearly summary statistics for the combined sample of insider data 
and analyst recommendation data17.  Each year is shown with: the number of firms; 
average number of analysts per firm; average number of analysts’ recommendations 
per firm; average number of insiders per firm; and average number of trades 
performed. Recommendations are aggregated at analyst-daily level. If there are 
multiple recommendations for an analyst in a same day then they are aggregated as 
one observation. Insider trades are also aggregated at a daily level. If there are 





















                                                     
17 The sample is a combination of two data sources. Therefore, it is possible that, for some 














1993 5221 2.42 2.51 3.30 7.37 
1994 5968 3.17 4.71 3.01 6.65 
1995 6317 2.97 4.49 3.33 7.52 
1996 7010 2.83 4.05 3.65 8.82 
1997 7232 2.84 3.94 3.43 8.41 
1998 7236 3.06 4.32 3.65 9.62 
1999 7123 3.16 4.30 3.51 9.66 
2000 6751 2.96 3.99 3.71 11.43 
2001 6086 3.11 4.35 3.60 12.09 
2002 5681 4.05 6.24 3.62 12.43 
2003 5525 3.72 5.36 3.89 12.62 
2004 5688 3.66 4.96 4.26 13.54 
2005 5712 3.40 4.59 4.22 13.01 
2006 5662 3.60 4.96 4.26 12.96 
2007 5804 3.43 4.79 4.32 13.12 
2008 5507 3.77 5.43 4.09 12.26 
2009 5063 3.94 5.43 3.72 11.04 
2010 4866 4.09 5.35 3.36 9.71 
2011 4944 4.01 5.31 4.23 12.04 







Table 1B. Summary Statistics for All Variables 
This table sets out the summary statistics for all variables. The first category is based 
on the insider-year level, i.e. the duplicate terms at insider-year level are deleted. The 
second category is based on the firm-year level. #Trades After(Before) A.R. is the 
number of insider trades within 7 days after (before) analyst recommendations in a 
calendar year. %Trades After(Before) A.R. is the percentage of insider trades within 7 
days after (before) analyst recommendations in a calendar year. Strategy_Dummy is a 
dummy variable equal to one, if the total number of insider trades after analyst 
recommendations in one year outnumbers that before analyst recommendations, and 
equals zero otherwise. Total Compensation is the natural log of insiders’ total 
compensation (‘tdc1’ in the ExecuComp database18), which includes base salary, 
bonuses, options, restricted stocks etc. Tenure is the number of years from the first 
record of the insider’s appointment at the company in the data to the current year. Age 
is the insiders’ age reported in ExecuComp. Number of Lawsuits is the number of 
lawsuits that firm is involved in during one calendar year. Sales are the firm’s yearly 
total sales. ROA is defined as the net income before extraordinary items, divided by 
















                                                     



















# of Trade After A. 
R. 460293 0.27 0.88 0 60 
# of Trade Before A. 
R. 460293 0.20 0.79 0 54 
% of Trade After A. 
R. 460293 0.10 0.26 0 1 
% of Trade Before 
A. R. 460293 0.07 0.22 0 1 
Strategy_dummy 460293 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Total Compensation 
($ Thousands) 56246 2492.49 5025.93 0 377996.5 
Age 50148 56.72 8.98 38 81 













Number of Lawsuits 81962 0.02 0.15 0 5 
Sales 77230 1960.35 9959.54 -1671.00 467231 
Yearly Ret 92563 0.01 0.06 -0.87 4 















Table 2. Insider Trading Patterns around Analyst Recommendation 
In this table, Panel A shows the difference in the number of insider trades in a short 
period (7 days) before and after analyst recommendations. The number of insider 
trades is the number of insider trades that occur in a short period (i.e. 7 days) 
before/after analyst recommendation; it increases by one if any insider places at least 
one trade in any day during that short period. A Placebo test is conducted by 
randomly assigning the dates of analysts’ recommendations. Panel B and Panel C 
show the difference in the number of opportunistic insider trades in a short period (7 
































Average number of  insider trades 0.251 0.319 0.067*** 
Average number of  insider trades 
(Placebo Test) 0.211 0.212 0.000 
 




  Before After 
Diff(after-
before) 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider sales 
0.032 0.039 0.006*** 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider buys 
0.004 0.007 0.004*** 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider sales (Placebo Test) 
0.029 0.0282 0.000 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider buys (Placebo Test) 
0.003 0.003 0.000 
 




  Before After 
Diff(after-
before) 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider sales 
0.030 0.054 0.023*** 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider buys 
0.004 0.005 0.001*** 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider sales (Placebo Test) 
0.033 0.033 -0.000 
Average number of opportunistic 
insider buys (Placebo Test) 
0.003 0.003 0.000 
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Table 3. Trading Patterns and Firm Litigation Risk 
This table shows the OLS regression on insiders’ trading behavior around analyst 
recommendations and firm litigation risk. The dependent variable Number of Trades 
(After-Before) is set to be equal to the number of insiders’ trades taking place after 
analyst recommendations, for a given year, minus the number of trades before 
recommendations. Column 1 is for consistent trades specifically, which are defined as 
the insiders’ trades that are consistent with analyst recommendations. Column 2 is for 
contrarian trades, which are defined as the insiders’ trades contrary to analyst 
recommendations. Firm Litigation Risk is equal to one if the company had suffered 
any lawsuit during the previous year and zero otherwise. Sales are the firm’s yearly 
total sales. ROA is defined as the net income, before extraordinary items, divided by 
the book value of assets. Last Year Return is the cumulative return from month -2 to 
month -13. Size is the total asset value of the firm. Book to Market is the ratio of book 
value divided by market capitalization. All independent variables are lagged by one 
year. 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Number of Consistent 
Trades (After-Before) 
Number of Contrarian 
Trades (After-Before) 
   
Firm Litigation Risk 0.007** 0.004 
 (2.12) (1.14) 
Size -0.000* 0.000*** 
 (-1.74) (4.41) 
Sale 0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (3.14) (-2.67) 
Last Year Return -0.004*** -0.008*** 
 (-3.85) (-7.39) 
Book to Market -0.001 -0.008** 
 (-0.44) (-2.40) 
ROA -0.004 0.002 
 (-1.52) (0.59) 
Constant -0.001 0.005 
 (-0.39) (1.19) 
Fixed Effect Firm, year Firm, year 
Observations 275,653 275,653 





Table 4. Trading Patterns React to Change of Regulation 
This table sets out changes in the proportion of insiders’ trades, taking place around 
analyst recommendations, across the period of implementation of the two insider 
regulatory reforms. % of Trades After (Before) A.R. is defined as the percentage of 
insider’s trades within 7 days after (before) analyst recommendations. Panel A1-A2 
shows the result for consistent trades, which are defined as insiders’ trades consistent 
with analyst recommendations. Panel B1-B2 shows the result for the contrarian trades, 
which are defined as the insiders’ trades contrary to analyst recommendations. Panel 
A1 and Panel B1 shows the proportion of trades around analyst recommendations and 
shifts in the proportional differences 1 year before and 1 year after the SEC 10b5-1 
Act of 2000. Panel A2 and B2 shows the proportion of trades around analyst 
recommendations and shifts of the proportional differences 1 year before and 1 year 




 Consistent Trades 
Panel A1 N % of Trades After A.R. % of Trades Before A.R. Diff T-value 
Before SEC 10b5-1 Act (1999) 70795 0.039 0.033 0.006 6.246 
After SEC 10b5-1 Act (2001) 74758 0.037 0.035 0.0022 2.417 
Diff-in-Diff       0.0038 2.809 
Panel A2 N % of Trades After A.R. % of Trades Before A.R. Diff T-value 
Before SOX. Act (2001) 74758 0.037 0.035 0.0022 2.417 
After SOX. Act (2003) 71002 0.062 0.054 0.0084 7.012 
Diff-in-Diff       -0.0062 -4.095 
 
 Contrarian Trades 
Panel B1 N % of Trades After A.R. % of Trades Before A.R. Diff T-value 
Before SEC 10b5-1 Act (1999) 70795 0.082 0.057 0.0248 19.441 
After SEC 10b5-1 Act (2001) 74758 0.084 0.062 0.0221 17.345 
Diff-in-Diff       0.0028 1.531 
Panel B2 N % of Trades After A.R. % of Trades Before A.R. Diff T-value 
Before SOX. Act (2001) 74758 0.084 0.062 0.0221 17.345 
After SOX. Act (2003) 71002 0.073 0.05 0.0228 18.45 






Table 5.  Market Reaction to Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation 
This table presents the market reaction to insider trades within the short period (7 
days) before and after analyst recommendations. The first two columns of this table 
set out insider sales; columns 3 and 4 are for insider buys; the last two columns 
summate all trades. The market reaction is measured by the absolute value of two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are computed from the 4-factor 
model based on Fama-French’s (1993) 3 factor model with the addition of 
momentum (Carhart, 1997).  
 
  Insider Sales Insider Buys Insider All Trades 
  N |CAR(0,1)| N |CAR(0,1)| N |CAR(0,1)| 
Before A. R. 54395 0.031 13364 0.039 67759 0.033 































Table 6.  Abnormal Profits of Insider Trades around Analyst Recommendation 
This table sets out the profits made from insider trades within a short period (7 days) 
before and after analyst recommendations. Panel A is restricted to the case when the 
analyst recommendation was to ‘sell’; Panel B shows the case of ‘buy’ 
recommendations. Abnormal Profit is measured by insider trades’ overall abnormal 
return on the next trading day, multiplied by -1 in the case of insider sales. Abnormal 
returns are computed, as above, from the 4-factor model based on Fama-French (1993) 




Before analyst sell 
recommendation 
After analyst sell 
recommendation   




sale  31987 0.003 27935 0.001 -0.002*** 
Insider 




Before analyst buy 
recommendation 
After analyst buy 
recommendation   




sale  42113 0 47133 0.001 0.002*** 
Insider 













Table 7. Trading Strategies and CEO Characteristics 
This table shows a logit regression analysis that was constructed with the objective of 
focusing on the behavior of one particular insider group: CEOs. The data range is 
from 1993 to 2005. The dependent variable, Market Timing, is a dummy variable 
equal to one, if a CEO places more contrarian trades than consistent trades after 
analyst recommendations, and equal to zero otherwise. Following Malmendier and 
Tate (2005), Overconfident is a dummy variable, equal to one if a CEO’s yearly 
exercisable unexercised option moneyness is larger than 67%, and zero otherwise. 
High Tenure is a dummy variable equal to one if the tenure of CEO is larger than the 
sample mean of CEO tenures. Salary is the yearly salary of the CEO. Gender is a 
dummy variable, equal to one if the CEO is male, and zero otherwise. Bonus is the 
yearly bonus of a CEO. Sales are the firm’s yearly total sales. ROA is defined as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by the book value of assets. Last Year 
Return is the cumulative return from month -2 to month -13. Size is total asset value 
of the firm. 
 











      
Overconfident  0.369*** 0.365*** 0.392*** 0.441*** 0.269*** 
 (10.34) (10.24) (4.39) (4.83) (2.74) 
High Tenure  0.251*** 0.201** 0.201** 0.219** 
  (3.67) (2.03) (2.02) (2.18) 
Gender   0.009 0.049 0.081 
   (0.02) (0.12) (0.20) 
Salary   0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
   (2.16) (2.37) (0.95) 
Bonus   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.83) (-0.69) (-1.29) 
Size     0.000 
     (1.11) 
Sale     0.000 
     (1.06) 
Last Year 
Return 
    0.312*** 
     (3.34) 
ROA     1.595*** 
     (2.93) 
Constant -1.746*** -1.761*** -1.780*** -14.814 -13.707 
 (-67.91) (-67.46) (-4.40) (-0.02) (-0.03) 
Fixed Effect No No No Year Year 
Pseudo R^2 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.020 0.030 





Appendix A. Development of Insider Trading Regulations 
After the Wall Street Crash, of 1929, the Security Act 1934 was enacted by the 
United States Congress. It was the first major piece of federal legislation that 
set out to govern insider trading. The Act established the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), which assumed the responsibility of 
enforcement of federal securities law.  
According to Section 16(b) of 1934 Act, insiders are defined as firms’ officers, 
directors, or shareholders with more than 10% ownership. If an individual is 
qualified as an insider, he or she must file a notice with the SEC within 10 
days of making a trade. Insiders are also required to report their transactions 
(e.g. using Form 4) to the SEC not later than 10 days after the end of the 
trading month
19
.  Insiders are also prohibited from seeking short-swing (within 
6 months) transaction profits from their trades; this means that insiders are 
forbidden to take profits from the purchase and sale of shares in their own 
companies within any 6 month timeframe. Any profits realized by insiders 
within this timeframe are required to be returned to the firm or to shareholders.  
Section 10(b)-5 of 1934 Act (setting out Rule 10b-5) establishes antifraud 
provisions relating to insider trading, so that the buying or selling of securities 
based on non-public material information is forbidden. This rule is applied, 
not only to insiders, but also to the employees and those benefitting from ‘tip 
offs’ from those with actual access to the material information source. The 
right of suing for damages, caused by the wrongdoing involved in trading 
                                                     




upon private information, is given to ordinary investors who purchase or sell 
the security and suffer loss as a result. 
An important amendment of 1934 Act was passed in 1938; the amendment 
created the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The NASD is 
the first Self-regulatory Organization (SRO), and takes responsibility for 
overseeing all stock market and broker firms. 
To supplement Rule 10b-5, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA) of 1984, 
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 
1988 were enacted.  These measures seek to enhance control of insider trading 
by introducing more stringent penalties. Prior to the ITSA, an insider who was 
identified as being involved in wrongdoing could only be penalized following 
criminal conviction for violation of the insider trading laws. Under the ITSA, 
the insider can also be penalized under civil enforcement procedures. The 
ITSFEA Act increases the level of the fines and penalties set out in ITSA. 
Liability for insiders, who misuse non-public information in violation of the 
Act, is capped at the greater of 1 million dollars, or 3 times the profits made or 
losses avoided by the insider. In addition, according to this Act, employers 
who fail to prevent insider trading by their employees can also be exposed to 
civil penalties. It requires firms to maintain a supervisory role to prevent 
illegal insider trading.   
The SEC released Rule 10b5-1 in October 2000 through enactment of the SEC 
10b5-1 Act. The new rule stated that trading while in possession of inside 
information is also a violation of Rule 10b-5. However, the rule also created a 
so-called “affirmative defense” to any charge of insider trading by using 
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preplanned trades. Preplanned trades are "designed to cover situations in 
which a person can demonstrate that the material nonpublic information was 
not a factor in the trading decision”20.  Such trades are made pursuant to a 
written plan lodged with a third party (for example a firm of brokers) before 
the person came to possess inside information. The existence of preplanned 
trades also offers a relief of some insider trading constraints because insiders 
could diversify their portfolio before possessing material non-public 
information.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provides a more detailed set of rules, 
at a federal level, for improving the reliability of the financial reporting 
process and of corporate governance. This Act increases the scrutiny 
associated with insider trading by tightening the reporting requirements 
associated with these transactions. Specifically, SOX amends the reporting 
requirement in Section 16(b) of the Act of 1934. It requires insiders reporting 
of trades (on Form 4) to take place within 2 business days, rather than 10 days, 






                                                     
20 From SEC Rule 10b5-1  
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Appendix B. Robustness Checks   
In this table, Panel A shows the difference in the number of insider trades across an 
extended period (14 days) before and after analyst recommendations. The number of 
insider trades is defined as the number of insider trades that occur during the 
extended period before and after analyst recommendations.  
Panel B shows an alternative measure for insiders’ activity before and after analyst 
recommendation (in the normal 7 days period), i.e. trading volume. Trading volume 
is a ratio of number of the value of shares involved in insiders’ trades divided by the 





  Before After 
Diff(after-
before) 
Average trading number of insider 
trades 
1.16 1.37 0.21*** 
 
Panel B Analyst Recommendation   
          Before        After    Diff(after-before) 





Appendix C. Trading Patterns compared across High-litigation Risk Industries 
and Low-litigation Risk Industries 
This table presents a comparison of insider trading patterns between High-litigation 
risk and Low-litigation risk industries. The classification of high litigation risk 
industries follows prior studies, and comprises the following sectors: retail (SIC 
codes 5200-5961); electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674); computing (SIC codes 3570-
3577 and 7370-7374); and bio-technology (SIC code 2833-2836 and 8731-8734). I 
define remaining sectors as low-litigation risk industries. For each category, I 
compute the proportion of analyst recommendations for which insiders place more 
trades after than before (After outnumber Before), and the proportion of analyst 
recommendations for which insiders place more trades before than after (Before 
outnumber After). The table also presents the results with a P-score matching method 
based on firm characteristics (Size, ROA, book to market ratio, sales, and last 12 
month return) and a year fixed effect. 









































93470 0.144 0.112 0.032 19.703 
  Difference 
 










Appendix D. Trading Patterns in High-Scrutiny and Low Scrutiny Firms  
Panel A in this table shows the insiders trading patterns for S&P1500 firms (High-
Scrutiny) and Non-S&P1500 firms (Low-Scrutiny). In each category, I compute the 
proportion of analyst recommendations for which insiders place more trades after 
than before (After outnumber Before), and the proportion of analyst recommendations 
that insiders place more trades before than after (Before outnumber After). Panel B 
presents the results together with a P-score matching method based on firm 
characteristics (Size, ROA, book to market ratio, sales, last 12 month return) and a 





















Panel A   N After outnumbers Before (%) Before outnumbers After (%) Diff T-value 
All sample Non-S&P1500 287983 0.064 0.05 0.014 22.219 
 
S&P500 105276 0.154 0.123 0.031 19.279 
 
Difference       -0.017 -12.044 
 
Non-S&P1500 287983 0.064 0.05 0.014 22.219 
 
S&P400(Mid Cap) 76690 0.148 0.111 0.036 20.051 
 
Difference       -0.022 -14.758 
 
Non-S&P1500 287983 0.064 0.05 0.014 22.219 
 
S&P600(Small Cap) 82046 0.141 0.107 0.034 19.958 
  Difference       -0.020 -13.746 
 
Panel B   N After outnumbers Before (%) Before outnumbers After (%) Diff T-value 
P-score  Non-S&P1500 48701 0.061 0.048 0.012 8.552 
 
S&P500 84043 0.155 0.123 0.031 17.175 
 
Difference       -0.018 -6.979 
 
Non-S&P1500 66968 0.077 0.06 0.017 12.092 
 
S&P400(Mid Cap) 61291 0.149 0.111 0.037 18.287 
 
Difference       -0.020 -8.222 
 
Non-S&P1500 89115 0.092 0.071 0.020 15.335 
 
S&P600(Small Cap) 66850 0.142 0.106 0.036 18.878 




Appendix E. Trading Patterns in Competitive Industries 
This table tests whether insider trading patterns around analyst recommendations vary 
between different industries with differing levels of competition. The competition 
measure used is the Hirfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), which is based on the three-
digit standard industry classification (SIC). Specifically, HHI is defined as the sum of 






 This represents industry i’s HHI in year j, where k is the firm’s index 
number in the industry. A higher HHI represents a lower level of competition. The 
HHI is categorized into 10 groups. In each group, I compute the proportion of analyst 
recommendations for which insiders place more trades after than before (After 
outnumber Before) and the proportion of analyst recommendations for which insiders 











outnumbers After Difference T-test 
1 
(Competitive) 0.122 0.097 0.025 23.739 
2 0.112 0.085 0.027 15.979 
3 0.118 0.091 0.027 12.296 
4 0.123 0.094 0.029 9.997 
5 0.122 0.089 0.033 9.481 
6 0.120 0.086 0.034 8.920 
7 0.117 0.092 0.025 6.105 
8 0.120 0.093 0.027 5.429 
9 0.111 0.084 0.027 5.211 
10(Non-
Competitive) 0.120 0.091 0.030 3.462 
Diff in Diff     -0.005 -0.528 
73 
 
Appendix F. Trading Patterns and Accuracy of Analysts 
Panel A in this table shows whether the level of accuracy of a particular analyst’s 
insights affects the trading patterns of insiders during the period surrounding 
publication of their reports. Analyst forecast error ratio is measured by the absolute 
value of the analyst’s earning forecast error, scaled by the actual earning figure for 
the stocks involved. High-accuracy analysts are defined as those whose yearly 
average forecast error ratio is lower than the median value for the remaining analysts. 
Low-accuracy analysts are those whose yearly average forecast error ratio is not 
lower than this median value. In each category, I compute the proportion of analyst 
recommendations that involve insiders placing more trades after than before they are 
published (After outnumber Before), and the proportion of analyst recommendations 
that involve insiders placing more trades before than after publication points (Before 
outnumber After). Panel B presents the results, together with a P-score matching 
method based on firm characteristics (Size, ROA, book to market, sales, last 12 
month return) and a year fixed effect. 
 























121709 0.137 0.11 0.027 18.963 
 













86099 0.146 0.117 0.029 16.632 




Appendix G. Trading Pattern and Return Predictability   
This table shows whether the existence of strategic trading behavior enhances the 
insider’s prediction ability. In each case, the dependent variable is the next month’s 
return. Opp_Buy is a dummy figure, equal to 1 if there was an opportunistic buy 
during the month in question. Opp_Sale is a dummy figure, equal to 1 if there was an 
opportunistic sale during the month in question. The definition of opportunistic buy 
or sale follows Cohen et al. (2012), who offer a proxy for informative insider buy/sale. 
# of Strategic Insiders is the number of insiders who trade more in the period after 
analyst recommendations.  BM is book to market ratio. Size is the market 
capitalization of the company in question, which is the fiscal year end price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Last Month Return is the monthly 
return over the last month. Last Year Return is the cumulative return between month -






















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Return Return Return Return Return Return 
       
Opp_Buy 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.013***   
  (3.83) (3.86) (5.36) (5.38)   
Opp_Sale -0.004** -0.004**   -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  (-2.33) (-2.31)   (-4.86) (-4.84) 
# of Strategic 
Insiders 
*Opp_Buy 
0.009 0.009 0.012* 0.012*   
  (1.27) (1.29) (1.73) (1.78)   
# of Strategic 
Insiders 
*Opp_Sale 
-0.004 -0.004   -0.005 -0.005 
  (-0.92) (-1.01)   (-1.34) (-1.43) 
# of Strategic 
Insiders 
0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.13) (0.10) (-1.60) (-1.85) (0.60) (0.57) 
Size -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-1.93) (-2.14) (-2.05) (-2.24) (-2.18) (-2.34) 
BM 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (2.87) (2.81) (2.94) (2.88) (3.24) (3.19) 
Last Month 
Return 
-0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.46) (-3.48) (-3.57) (-3.51) (-3.61) 
Last Year 
Return 
0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 
 (1.98) (1.84) (1.87) (1.74) (1.80) (1.67) 
Constant 0.008*** -0.004 0.005*** -0.007** 0.012*** -0.000 
 (4.17) (-1.19) (3.72) (-2.22) (6.14) (-0.06) 
Month Fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 36,824 36,824 36,824 36,824 36,824 36,824 




Appendix H. Trading Pattern and Compensation 
This table shows the relationship between insiders’ timing trading pattern and yearly 
compensation. The dependent variable, Total Compensation, is the natural log of 
insiders’ total compensation (tdc1 in the ExecuComp database), which includes base 
salary, bonuses, options, restricted stocks etc. #Trades After(Before) A.R. is the 
number of insider trades made after (before) analyst recommendations in a calendar 
year. Strategy_Dummy is a dummy variable, equal to one if the total number of 
insider trades after analyst recommendation in one year outnumbers that before 
analyst recommendation, and equal to zero otherwise. Sales are the firm’s yearly total 
sales. ROA is defined as the net income before extraordinary items divided by the 
book value of assets. Last Year Return is the cumulative return from month -2 to 
month -13. Tenure is the number of years between the first record of the insider’s 
presence within the company staff to the current year. Age is the insider age, reported 
in ExecuComp. All independent variables are lagged one year. Standard error is 





















 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total Compensation Total Compensation 
   
#Trades After A.R. 0.072***  
 (6.23)  
#Trades Before A.R. 0.012  
 (0.50)  
Strategy_Dummy  0.161*** 
  (8.76) 
Sales 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (5.23) (5.23) 
Last Year Return 1.272*** 1.346*** 
 (5.14) (5.43) 
Tenure 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (5.41) (5.50) 
Age 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (6.24) (6.44) 
ROA 0.172 0.171 
 (1.62) (1.57) 
Constant 5.880*** 5.867*** 
 (45.12) (45.77) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 32,891 32,891 
R-squared 0.143 0.141 
 
 
 
